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Abstract
In this paper we advocate a new initial allocation mechanism for a tradable
pollution permit market. We outline a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC) that dis-
tributes permits to rms based on their rank relative to other rms. This ranking
is achieved by ordering rms based on an observable external actionwhere the
external action is an activity or characteristic of the rm that is independent
of their choice of emissions in the tradeable permit market. We argue that this
mechanism has a number of benets over auctioning and grandfathering. Using
this mechanism e¢ ciently distributes permits, allows for the attainment of a sec-
ondary policy objective and has the potential to be more politically appealing
than existing alternatives.
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1 Introduction
The key feature of tradeable permit markets is that, in theory, they allow society to
achieve a given reduction in pollution at the lowest costs to the economy. Under ideal
conditions, how permits are initially allocated amongst polluting rms will not e¤ect
this cost-e¢ ciency property. This has led many to view decisions over how to initially
allocate permits as being mainly decisions about fairness, rather than e¢ ciency. Dat-
ing back to Hahn (1984) and Stavins (1995), economists have pointed to ways in which
initial allocations can matter for cost e¢ ciency, and this has led to an active debate
investigating the optimal choice of initial allocation mechanisms. This debate takes on
much greater relevance given the current expansion of tradeable permit schemes world-
wide, such as Phase Two of the EU-ETS, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
and Western Climate Initiative schemes in the US. The two alternatives for initial al-
location which most have considered are grandfathering (a free allocation of permits
based on historical emissions or outputs), and the auctioning of permits (Goulder 1995;
Parry 1995; Parry et al. 1999; Cramton and Kerr 2002; Requate 2005). Grandfather-
ing occurs when the regulator freely allocates allowances to each rm based on their
historical emissions (or perhaps output or some other proxy). Although a popular and
frequently used mechanism, grandfathering is far from an ideal allocation mechanism
as it is often viewed as politically cumbersome and ine¢ cient (Stavins 1998; Cramton
and Kerr 2002). Firms may have an incentive to lobby the regulator in favour of larger
permit allocations which, due to the use of wasteful resources, may reduce social welfare
in the economy. Moreover, when grandfathering is used with information that is up-
dated over time updated grandfathering a link is created between a rms current
level of emissions and its future permit allocation which may result in a distortionary
incentive to increase emissions (Böhringer and Lange 2005; MacKenzie et al. 2008). In
this case, grandfathering no longer produces a cost-e¢ cient level of abatement on the
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part of rms. This is because rms know that they can inuence the amount of permits
they are allocated in a future period through their permit holdings during the current
period.
The main alternative to grandfathering is generally considered to be auctioning. In
an auction, permits are allocated to each rm based on their monetary bid relative to
every other rm (Lyon 1982; Hahn and Noll 1982; Oehmke 1987; Franciosi et al. 1993;
Cramton and Kerr 2002). Auctions are often considered to be a lump-sumallocation
mechanism as permits are distributed to each rm independent of their historical emis-
sions, thus removing one of the problems arising in updated grandfathering schemes.
Due to this characteristic, auctioning is viewed as a desirable and e¢ cient method of
allocating permits (Cramton and Kerr 2002). However, the main drawback, and as a
result, the main reason for the infrequent use of auctions is the political di¢ culty in
implementing such a mechanism. As the winners in the auction are obliged to pay
for their permits, rmsresistance against implementing auctions have been a severe
restriction on the implementation of such schemes. The nancial burden of pollution
control to rms under an auction may be as great as under an emissions tax (Hanley,
Shogren and White, 2007).1
It is possible to reduce rmsresistance to auctions by redistributing permit auction
revenues to the participants (a revenue-neutral auction (Hahn and Noll (1982)) or to
reduce distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy (the revenue recycling e¤ect (Parry
1995; Parry et al. 1999)). However, such schemes are very rarely implemented, and
may therefore attract little credibility with lobbyists when auction schemes are proposed
(Goulder,1995; Pezzy and Park, 1998). With problems associated with both grandfa-
thering and auctioning it is therefore desirable to try and nd alternative mechanisms
1Auctioning, however, is slowly becoming an increasingly important and favoured initial allocation
mechanism in existing tradeable permit markets, such as the US SO Acid RainProgram and the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).
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for the initial allocation of tradeable permits. Indeed, the literature has rarely consid-
ered the use of alternative allocation mechanisms beyond grandfathering and auctions.
The aim of this paper to broaden the discussion of allocation mechanisms by outlining
an alternative allocation mechanism that may be preferred to existing approaches.
Our proposed alternative mechanism, a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC), distrib-
utes permits to rms based on their rank relative to each other. The ranking is achieved
by ordering rms based on an observable external actionwhere the external action is
an activity or characteristic of the rm that is independent of their choice of emissions
in the tradeable permit market. This ranking criterion is determined by the regulator
who chooses this to meet a secondary policy objective. We argue that this mechanism
has a number of additional benets over traditional allocation schemes. Similar to auc-
tions, a PAC will e¢ ciently allocate permits in the tradable permit market. However, it
can simultaneously achieve a secondary policy objective, such as the reduction in noise
pollution or improvement in corporate and social responsibility targets. Given the wide
variety of possible ranking criteria and secondary policy objectives available, the PAC
may also be easier to implement in the face of intense interest group pressure than an
auction.
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the alloca-
tion mechanism and the possible benets of implementing such as scheme. Section 3
discusses the regulators optimal choice of permit distribution in the PAC, while Section
4 illustrates the potential implementation of the mechanism in the European Emissions
Trading Scheme and Section 5 concludes.
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2 A Permit Allocation Contest
To understand how a Permit Allocation Contest has the potential to work in a tradable
permit market, it is benecial to consider the di¤erent possible types of contest that
exist. Two main mechanisms exist: rank-order tournaments and rank-order contests.
The distinction between the two rests on the relationship between agentsunobservable
e¤ort and observable actions. Rank-order tournaments are incentive schemes used in
situations where rmsperformance is observed with some exogenous noise. That is, in
rank-order tournaments, it is generally assumed that each agent experiences a stochastic
relationship between their e¤ort and actions. For example, in the control of non-point
source pollution, an agents e¤orts could be in the form of land management changes.
The regulator cannot observe these e¤orts, but instead measures the e¤ects of this e¤ort
on water quality. However, stochastic processes determine the relationship between the
farmers e¤ort, and the consequent impacts on water quality, making it di¢ cult for
the regulator to infer what the farmer has or has not done. When the observation
noise is common to all rms, rank-order tournaments typically outperform absolute, or
individualistic, schemes (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Holmström 1982; Green and Stokey
1983; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz 1983; Mookherjee 1984).
When there is no individual-specic noise involved in the observation of rmsac-
tions, one can implement a rank-order contest, which is, in e¤ect, a multi-prize all-
pay auction (Glazer and Hassin 1988; Barut and Kovenock 1998; Clark and Riis 1998;
Moldovanu and Sela 2001; 2006). This di¤ers from tournaments as agents in rank-order
contest models are generally assumed to have a deterministic relationship between e¤ort
and actions. In a rank-order contest, there is a nite number of prizes to be distributed
among the participating agents, with the size of each prize known before the onset of
the contest. Firms compete in this contest by submitting costly (monetary or non-
monetary) "bids". Firms then are ranked in order of their bids, and the "prizes" are
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distributed to the rms according to rmsrankings. That is, a rm that submits the
highest bid is ranked rst, and thus gets the largest permit allocation ("rst prize"), the
rm that submits the second-highest bid is ranked second, and thus gets second-largest
allocation ("second prize"), and so on, up to the rm that submits the lowest bid being
ranked last, and thus receiving the smallest allocation (possibly nothing). Rank-order
contests, like tournaments, tend to outperform alternative types of individualistic and
contract based regulation.
In this paper we discuss the implementation of a rank-order contest. A similar
argument can also be applied to rank-order tournaments. Our rank-order contest, the
Permit Allocation Contest, attempts to reach a middle ground between grandfathering
and auctioning as an initial allocation mechanism. As our model is a type of multi-
unit all-pay auction it has many similarities to a standard permit auction. Yet, as
the ranking criterion in the PAC can be non-monetary, it can share certain desirable
characteristics with a grandfathering mechanism.
2.1 The allocation mechanism
Consider a competitive tradable permit market with n participating rms. Within
this market each rm has the option either to purchase permits from the market or to
abate pollution. However, each rm must hold enough permits to cover their emissions.
The regulator has responsibility of initially allocating permits to the participating rms.
Aside from regulating emissions in a tradable permit market, let us assume the regulator
also has a secondary (unrelated) objective where the regulator aims to minimise a social
badproduced by all rms in the permit market. This secondary objective could relate
to the improvement of health and safety incidents, reductions in noise pollution, cuts
in other pollutants not related to the permit market, or encouraging corporate social
responsibility. Therefore, in our model, the regulator aims to minimise the aggregate
6
social bad(or maximise some social benet) by using incentives in the form of permit
allocations (without the need for standard command and control regulation). This turns
out to provide an attractive way of allocating permits.
The regulator is assumed to have two non-competing policy objectives. Firstly,
the regulator is motivated to choose a schedule of permit allocations to minimise the
aggregate abatement cost in the tradeable permit marketthe standard permit market
regulatory objective. Second, the additional objective of the regulator is to provide
incentives for the permit market rms to achieve some predetermined public policy
target linked to the external actions of rms which we dene as the maximisation
of expected aggregate external actions. As such, the regulator is assumed to adopt
economic e¢ ciency as its sole criterion: whilst it wishes a cost-e¤ective solution to
the pollution control problem which the permit market addresses, it seeks the biggest
improvement in its secondary objective (say, health and safety at work). For present
purposes, it will be su¢ cient to assume that the marginal benets of this secondary
objective are always bigger than the marginal costs; or that the secondary objective is
deemed to be desirable on other grounds (eg ethical or political).
To keep the argument as general as possible, we assume that rms will be ranked on
their choice of an observable external action. External actions are those which allow
the regulator to meet its secondary objective. To adhere to the regulators public policy
objective, rm i chooses an external action (such as reductions in noise pollution)
denoted by zi, in which it bears a cost v(zi). The external action can be, at the
extreme, an invariant characteristic of a rm, e.g. population for a country under a
global tradeable permit market. However, it is most likely that an external factor will
be chosen so that rms have the ability to alter their permit allocation. The observable
external actionis an activity or characteristic of the rm which is independent from its
choice of emissions and the permit market. The regulator aims to select an appropriate
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criterion to rank all rms so that the action is independent of emission choices and
where the aggregate action can full an objective set by the regulator.2
In order for rms to obtain a permit allocation, the regulator chooses an ordered
schedule (vector) of permit allocations, s = (s1; s2; : : : ; sn) 2 Rn+ subject to s1  s2 
: : :  sn  0 and
Pn
j=1 sj = E where sj is the j
th permit allocation and E is the absolute
aggregate emissions cap for the tradeable permit market (the regulators precise choice
of permit allocations will be considered later in this paper). Using this permit allocation
schedule, the regulator distributes a (possibly unequal) permit allocation to each rm
whilst ensuring the absolute emissions cap is binding. The specic permit allocation
to a rm depends on each rms size of external action relative to every other rm,
so that rms that have a larger relative size of external action obtain a larger permit
allocation.3
In a PAC, the regulator observes the external actions of all rms and ranks them
in descending order of their external action where the rm with the highest level of
external action is ranked rst, the second highest rm is ranked second and so on
until all rms are ranked. Each ranked-ordered rm obtains a corresponding permit
allocation so that the rm with the top ranking obtains the largest permit allocation
(s1), the second ranked obtains the second highest permit allocation (s2) and so on
until all individual permit allocations are distributed to the rms.
2In most permit markets, the participation of rms in the permit market is usually dependent
on their inclusion in a product market e.g. a permit market may require participation of all energy
producers. Given the permit market participants have similar product markets, it is possible that each
rm in the permit market has a number of characteristics or actionsthat are comparable amongst
all participants, independently chosen from its emissions and socially benecial, which can be used as
the external factor.
3The regulator must choose an external action that is feasible for the tradeable permit market.
participating rms. In addition, if the industry exhibits increasing returns to scale, a regulator could
allocate permits based on how each rms present external action compares to its own past external
action - e.g. based on the percentage reduction of noise pollution over time. However, scale e¤ects
will be captured by the form of the cost function described later. To avoid size e¤ects, it is likely the
regulator could use changes in external action throughout time, for example, the relative reduction of
noise pollution over time.
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Firms are assumed to have di¤erent abilities at producing their external action (ie
di¤erent costs). In particular, each rm privately knows their ability parameter before
the PAC commences. Although each rm knows its own ability parameter and the dis-
tribution of ability parameters for its competitors, no rm knows the actual realization
of its rivalsability parameters. The regulator is assumed to also know the distribution
of abilities, but not the individual ability level of each rm. Similarly, although the
permit allocation schedule is common knowledge, each rms actual permit allocation
is uncertain at the time of the decision-making. In other words, by participating in
PAC, all rms engage in a game of incomplete information. Given its knowledge of own
ability, of the distribution of abilities, and of schedule of permit allocations, each rm
uses its expectations of permit allocation to choose an optimal level of external action.
Firmsoptimal external actions are determined by a number of factors. First, the
shape (or curvature) of the cost function v() is an important determinant of the level of
external action chosen by each rm. Indeed, the lessconvex a rms cost function, the
higher the optimal external action. Second, a higher market equilibrium permit price
would lead to each rm choosing a higher external action. Third, a general increase in
the regulators schedule of permit allocations would increase the value of the marginal
permit allocation, thus increasing the optimal external action. This might result from
a fall in the number of rms who will be allocated permits. Furthermore, an increase
in the number of rms, as well as certain changes in the distribution of abilities may
also lead to higher optimal external actions.
3 Whats good about a Permit Allocation Contest?
Having outlined the nature of the PAC, we now review some of the advantages of this
approach to permit allocation, relative to auctions or grandfathering. The potential of
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rank-based mechanisms has been pointed out by few authors. By applying the seminal
work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), Govindasamy et al. (1994) advocated the use of a
tournament to control non-point pollution, whereby each polluting rm is ranked by its
input use or pollution abatement e¤ort. Govindasamy et al. (1994) found that a tour-
nament can work well as it can achieve the same e¢ ciency conditions as a Pigouvian tax
but with less costly information requirements. Shogren and Hurley (1997) experimen-
tally tested a tournament reward system to consider the implication for environmental
policy (for example, they considered Coasian bargaining and environmental conict)
and found that using such a reward system made the experiment participants behave
in a similar manner to theoretical predictions (for example, the Coasian bargaining out-
come was achieved). They showed that tournaments reached the theoretical outcomes
quicker than other "standard" mechanisms which suggests tournaments systems can
provide robust incentives to e¤ectively implement environmental regulation
3.1 Stronger incentives to invest in actions to reduce other
bads
In a PAC, the decisions regarding the number and size of permit allocations has a
substantially di¤erent e¤ect on the incentives of each rm compared to alternative
mechanisms, such as a winner-pays auction. The permit allocations in a PAC are
not directly related to the rmsexternal actions, but instead they are determined by
rmsrankings according to the size of their external actions. Thus, a small increase
in the rms external actions may result in a disproportionately large change in permit
allocation. For example, a small increase in external action by the second-ranked rm
could make this rm the winner of the contest, and thus lead to the largest permit
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allocation (which is typically made to be substantially larger than the "second prize").4
Moreover, as Krishna and Morgan (1997) showed, all-pay auctions tend to generate
higher aggregate bids than their winner-pay counterparts, that is, traditional permit
auctions. In addition, as Moldovanu and Sela (2001) showed, when the prize structure
is suitably chosen, such a contest will tend to generate the largest aggregate bids (in
our case, the largest improvement in the secondary objective). As the choice of exter-
nal action at the margin can signicantly alter a rms permit allocation, the robust
incentives created in the PAC system should induce all rms to maximise their external
action.
3.2 Flexible options for the regulator in improve policy ac-
ceptability
As the ranking criterion need not be monetary in value, a wide variety of possible
external actions can exist (any action that is independent of emissions choices is admis-
sible). It follows that one may be chosen so that the pollution permit scheme is more
politically acceptable for the regulator, market participants and the wider economy.
Consequently, a PAC system has the possibility of being implemented in a wide variety
of tradeable permit market contexts. For instance, a PAC could be implemented in an
international permit market where the participating countries are allocated permits (or
a burden is assigned to each country) based on their (country) external actions, such
as the proportion of recycling in each country. The system could also be adapted to
smaller markets, such as rms choosing external actions based on their improvement
in noise pollution. Every tradeable permit market has heterogeneous circumstances
in which it operates and with a PAC, public policy objectives (and external actions)
4This frequently happens in sport tournaments where the di¤erence between prizes (and notably
between rst and second prizes) is non-linearly increasing (Szymanski 2003).
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can be chosen to compliment the social normsand prevailing political opinion in the
specic emissions trading scheme. In contrast, although auctioning and grandfathering
can be used in all tradeable permit markets, the only allocation criterion available is
the comparison of rmsmoney bidsand historical emissions, respectively. The lack
of other possible allocation criterion may make implementation more di¢ cult.
3.3 Political benets
Using a PAC in a tradeable permit market o¤ers the political benet of having a
clear connection between permit allocations (including the di¤erences between them)
and some socially benecial rm action. This avoids one criticism of grandfathering,
namely that it results in polluters being rewarded with valuable permits for their pre-
vious polluting actions: heavy polluters typically being awarded more permits at the
start of the market than smaller polluters. It is possible that a PAC system may ac-
tually appear fairer to a number of groups in society than alternative mechanisms as
it couples permit allocation (a reward to the rms) with some public policy objective.
In contrast, grandfathering permits creates a perverse link between emissions and the
value of permits each rm receives.5
Similar to the auctioning of permits, a PAC takes an instrumentalistperspective in
that it ignores past and current permit holdings when determining permit allocations
(Raymond 2003). Therefore, this type of allocation approach treats all rms equally
in that rms who invest early in pollution abatement are not implicitly punished (as
would happen under a grandfathering scheme). However, unlike an auction, a PAC
mechanism can be adapted so non-monetary criterion are used to rank the rms which
5The equitable issues associated with permit allocation are notoriously under researched in eco-
nomics, mainly due to the normative aspects involved (Raymond 2003). All allocation mechanisms
can appear fairas it very much depends on the attitude to property and the specic circumstances,
i.e. an industry level or global emissions trading scheme.
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may be more appealing to participating rms than an auction. For example, a non-
monetary criterion may be chosen which is closer to the production and/or managerial
decisions of rms.
3.4 The existence of an appropriate external factor
Although a PAC distribution mechanism has a number of possible advantages over
alternative mechanisms, a limitation of a PAC is that the external action must be
dened in an appropriate manner. As noted above, an optimal external action has to
be independent of emissions so that no distortions are created in the permit market
whilst simultaneously being politically acceptable and observable to the regulator. The
ease with which an external action can be chosen crucially depends on the specic
institutional context of the permit market. For instance, when the market participants
are countries such as in an international permit market, it may be relatively easy to
nd an external action that is both socially benecial and independent of emissions.
Countries in a carbon dioxide permit market, such as the EU-ETS, could be ranked
on the proportional reduction of landll waste from the non-trading sector (or the
production of methane from it), or on some social goal such as reductions in road
tra¢ c accidents, or the percentage of rms signing up to Corporate Social Responsibility
agreements.
4 The regulators optimal choice of allocations
In a PAC, the regulator has the ability to allocate permits based on a criterion that
it chooses. We now look into how the regulator can maximize the aggregate external
actions to achieve its secondary objective by choosing an appropriate permit allocation
schedule; and at how this relates to the subsequent operation of the tradeable permit
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market.
As Glazer and Hassin (1988) and Barut and Kovenock (1998) showed, have proved
to maximise the aggregate external action, the lowest-ranked permit allocation sn must
involve zero permits. If this did not occur, otherwise, there would be an incentive
for rms with weakerabilities to reduce their level of external action and obtain a
positive level of permit allocation. Choosing a vector of permit allocations with sn = 0
will induce each rm to choose a non-zero level of external action. In essence, have
(n   1) non-zero permit allocations. If the rm who is ranked last still expects to
receive a permit allocation, no matter how small, then this produces an incentive to
take no action.
Some general insights to the problem were provided by Moldovanu and Sela (2001;
2006) and references therein, advocating for some discriminatory features of contests.
In particular, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) showed that when costs functions are linear
or concave, it is optimal to allocate the prize "pie" to only a single "rst" prize. They
also showed when cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be optimal.
As is known in the theoretical literature, only the "allocation distance" between
neighbouring-ranked permit allocations sj 1   sj is important for rms incentives.
That is, what is important is how much more permits a j-th ranked rm could have
obtained from moving one rank up to rank j   1, rather than the absolute levels of
permit allocations sj and sj 1. Thus, one of the important questions to be addressed is
whether an optimal allocation schedule involves consequently ranked allocations which
are equal to each other. To see this, let us think what happens when an allocation sj
increases. For 2  j  n   1, any unit increase in an allocation sj has two e¤ects.
First, as sj increases, this decreases the "upward distance" sj 1   sj, and thus has a
negative "upward distance" e¤ect. Second, as sj increases, the "downward distance"
sj   sj+1 increases, so that the "downward distance" e¤ect is positive. Given this we
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can immediately see that s1 , the rst permit allocation, has only positive marginal
e¤ects. That is, s1 only has a "downward distance" e¤ect which means increasing the
rst allocation will result in aggregate external actions increasing. In contrast, the
last permit allocation sn only has a negative "upward distance" e¤ect, which means
increasing the lowest allocation will result in a reduction in aggregate external actions.
As the marginal e¤ect of sn is negative, this is su¢ cient to require that the bottom-
ranked allocation sn is equal to zero.
For a tradable permit market with n rms, a regulator would maximise a secondary
objective whilst e¢ ciently allocating permits to the market if only (n   1) permit
allocations were distributed This would incentivise low ability rms to select a positive
level of external actions, as noted above. Given the allocations are uncertain at the
point of deciding a level of allocation, all rms will participate as their expected value
of permit allocation is signicantly large. Note this expected values has the ability of
being altered by the regulators selection of permit allocations. As the lowest ranked
rm obtains no permits from the contest, the rm will, as in a normal competitive
market, abate pollution up to the point at which their marginal abatement cost is
equated to the permit price.
One popular permit allocation schedule discussed in tradeable permit market liter-
ature involves an egalitarian distribution of permits across all rms or countries (Ray-
mond 2003). For example, allocating an equal number of permits per capita has been
strongly advocated as a distributional rule for an international permit market (Kvern-
dokk 1995; Rose et al. 1998). While some form of egalitarian allocation may have a
number of merits, it may not be desirable to achieve the second policy objective. To
see this, consider an extreme egalitarian allocation where rms obtain identical num-
ber of permits independent of all rmsactions or characteristics a purelump-sum
approach, i.e. s1 = s2 =    = sj 1 = sj =    = sn (in other words, all "allocation
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distances" are zero). In such a scenario, the regulators schedule of permit allocations
is segal = (E
n
; E
n
; : : : ; E
n
), where each rm in the PAC obtains an identical share of the
aggregate emissions cap. This means that the distribution of permits is independent
of each rms choice of external action, and that no incentive exists for rms to choose
a positive level of external action. In policy terms, this type of egalitarian approach
should not be chosen if the regulator wants to combine the permit allocation of a trade-
able permit market with a public policy objective. For a regulator to succeed in a
public policy objective, it must instead choose a schedule of permit allocations that
discriminates in favour of rms with larger external actions and against the ones with
smaller actions.
4.1 Example: the case of four rms
We consider a simple case, assuming a uniform distribution of rms abilities with
support

1
2
; 1

. Recall that the bottom-ranked permit allocation sn is set equal to zero.
As Figure 1a shows, the marginal e¤ect of the top allocation s1 is the highest for the
lowest-cost rms. On the other hand, the marginal e¤ect of the second-ranked allocation
s2 peaks out for the mid-range costs, and the e¤ect for the third-ranked allocation s3
peaks out for the relatively higher-cost rms, and, moreover, the heights of the peaks are
similar. This, together with the convexity of costs, suggests a possibility that it might
be optimal to set the third-ranked allocation s3 equal to the second-ranked allocation
s2.
Indeed, let us rst check what happens if we set the third-ranked allocation s3 equal
to zero. Setting s3 = 0 allows us to express the middle allocation as s2 = E   s1, with
s1 2

E
3
; E

. In this case, as Figure 1b suggests, the expected aggregate external action
has a maximum around s1  E2 . In other words, here it is not optimal to allocate the
entire pie of permit allocations only to a single top-ranked rm, i.e. we need that
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a) b) c)
Figure 1: Case of n = 4, i  U

1
2
; 1

: a) the total marginal e¤ects of allocations s1; s2;
and s3 (the solid red curve, the narrowly dashed blue curve, and the widely dashed green
curve, respectively), as a function of the cost parameter i; b) the aggregate external
action T as a function of the top-ranked allocation s1 for s3 = 0, s2 = E   s1; c) the
aggregate external action T as a function of the second-ranked allocation s2 for s1 = E2 ,
s3 =
E
2
  s2 (for E = 1, p = 1, v() =
p).
s1 < E. Furthermore, if we now set the top-ranked allocation equal to a half of the
pie (so that s3 = E2   s2), the Figure 1c conrms that it would be optimal to set the
third-ranked allocation to be equal to the second-ranked allocation, i.e. s2 = s3. Thus,
the optimal allocation schedule for four rms and costs distributed uniformly on

1
2
; 1

,
will be approximately equal to s1  E2 ; s2  s3  E4 ; s4 = 0.
Performing similar manipulations for costs distributed uniformly on [1; 5], we nd
that the optimal allocation schedule for four rms will be approximately equal to s1 
4E
5
; s2  s3  E10 ; s4 = 0 (see Figure 2).
Similarly, we found that for other uniform distributions, the pattern is similar, i.e.
the highest expected aggregate external action happens when there is a relatively large
top allocation, followed by two equal allocations, with the bottom allocation being zero.
For example, for i  U

1
3
; 1

, we have that s1  3E5 ; s2  s3  E5 ; s4 = 0; for U [1; 2]
- s1  E2 ; s2  s3  E4 ; s4 = 0; U [1; 10] - s1  9E10 ; s2  s3  E20 ; s4 = 0. While our
numerical ndings may not be robust with respect to the shape of the distribution
17
a) b) c)
Figure 2: Case of n = 4, i  U [1; 5]: a) the total marginal e¤ects of allocations s1; s2;
and s3 (the solid red curve, the narrowly dashed blue curve, and the widely dashed
green curve, respectively), as a function of the cost parameter i; b) the aggregate
external action T as a function of the top-ranked allocation s1 for s3 = 0, s2 = E   s1;
c) the aggregate external action T as a function of the second-ranked allocation s2 for
s1 =
4E
5
, s3 = E5   s2 (for E = 1, p = 1, v() =
p).
and the number of rms, we are however able to show, similarly to Moldovanu and
Sela (2001), that the optimal allocation schedule in the presence of convex costs need
not be very discriminatory, possibly exhibiting equal consecutively-ranked allocations.
However, our work also suggests a possibility that the optimal allocation schedules will
tend to involve the top allocation s1 to be larger than the lower-ranked allocations.
This case is instructive, as it shows some important features of contests. Here, in
order to lift o¤ the external action by the relatively high-cost rms, the regulator
may need to award a positive middle allocation. However, at the margin, the middle
allocation is less e¤ective for the relatively low-cost rms. Thus, if the realized sample
of rmscosts parameters consists only of relatively high cost parameters, the ex-post
optimal schedule involves equal top and middle allocations. If, instead, the realized
sample of rmscosts parameters consists only of relatively low cost parameters, the
ex-post optimal schedule involves only a single top allocation. However, since here
the cost parameters are rmsprivate information, one needs to look into the ex-ante
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regulators problem, i.e. to look into the expected total external actions.
5 Potential applications to the EU-ETS.
To illustrate the many possible applications of the PAC permit allocation mechanism,
we discuss the possible consequences for implementing in the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS). The EU-ETS was the rst emissions trading scheme in the world
to set compulsory CO2 targets. Commencing in 2005 with phase periods 2005-2007
and 2008-2012, aggregate emissions of participating (trading) sectors such as energy,
cement, glass paper and pulp, were capped. This resulted in nearly 12,000 installations
being regulated which produced 46% of the total EU CO2 emissions (Watanabe and
Robinson, 2005). To implement a PAC, we discuss two possible scenarios where (i) rms
participate in the PAC to obtain permit allocation and (ii) members states participate
in a PAC to obtain a level of overall aggregate emissions.
Consider a PAC where the participants are rms within the EU-ETS. Let us rst
assume that the PAC is decentralised to each member state. Within a PAC, the par-
ticipating rms would be ranked in order of their external action. For the EU-ETS,
the external action may be chosen by each member states to achieve a secondary policy
objective which is entirely focused on Member Statespreferences. For example, corpo-
rate and social responsibility may be a requirement. This may be politically appealing
for Member states with unique policy requirements. Allowing the decentralisation of
the PAC may have the potential to cause strategic behaviour in the choice of a sec-
ondary policy objective. For instance, a Member State may choose a relatively "easy"
secondary objective, where their rms have relatively low cost in completing an action
and hence reduce the cost of obtaining permits. However, the PAC can deal with this
issue by ranking rms such that the absolute level of external actions no longer mat-
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ters. Another possibility is for the PAC to be centralised within the EU-ETS. In such a
case, the European Commission selects the external action and secondary public policy.
This may be benecial due to the prevention of strategic behaviour by Member states.
Moreover, the European Commission can focus on a specic requirement that it values
as important for all rms in the EU-ETS, for example, the reduction in noise pollution,
or the improvement of health and safety at work. By allowing rms to participate in a
PAC, many possible secondary benets can be produced, whilst avoiding the problems
of grandfathering and auctions. However, it may be di¢ cult to select an external action
as not all rms may share su¢ cient characteristics in terms of the secondary objective.
One other possibility is to allow Member states to participate in the PAC. Currently,
the Kyoto Protocol allows regional economic regions, such as the EU, to legitimately
act, sign and ratify the convention (and any future protocols) on a EU scale whilst using
internal procedures to di¤erentiate targets amongst the member states (United Nations,
1992). In other words, the EU was allowed to create a bubblewhere the burden of a
common EU target could be redistributed between member states commonly known as
the Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA) (Phylipsen et al., 1998; Ringius, 1999; European
Commission, 2000; Lacasta et al., 2002; European Union, 2003). After signicantly
costly and drawn-out political discussions an agreement was reached in 1998 where
European carbon dioxide emissions would, in net, reduce by 8 per cent of 1990 levels.
An alternative to the BSA is to introduce a PAC to determine the carbon dioxide
reduction burden each member state has to bear. The European Commission could
outline a contest in which lower burdens of carbon dioxide reduction are awarded to
higher-ranked member states in a PAC. Ranking member states on some criterion would
be relatively simple. For example, ranking could be based on member states non-
permit trading sectors improvements in pollution from domestic transport, pollution
from landlls, recycling, and so on. So long as the criterion avoids correlations between
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actions and carbon dioxide abatement activities in the permit market, then the PAC
is an e¢ cient allocation mechanism. Additionally, the Europe Commission can focus
on inducing Member States to comply with other EU regulations e.g. reduction in
landll waste, water quality and so on. Instead of allocation being based purely on
political factors, allowing the PAC to distribute abatement burdens rewards Member
States who have successfully produced actions that benet the European Commissions
other public policy objectives.
6 Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to outline a new type of permit allocation mechanism.
In our model, the initial allocation of tradeable pollution permits is done via a Permit
Allocation Contest (PAC). A PAC is a rank-order contest in which the rms are allo-
cated permits according to the ordinal rank of the size of their external action. This is
an activity or characteristic of the participating rms that is independent of emissions
choices, and which contributes towards achieving a secondary social objective.
In our model, the regulator was assumed to have two policy objectives. First, by
allocating permits based on the external action (rather than based on emissions), the
regulator aims to minimise the aggregate cost of reducing emissions through avoiding
interference with the least-cost potential of a tradeable permit market. Second, by
choosing a suitable permit allocation schedule (i.e. the number of permits that rms
can obtain by being ranked rst, second, and so on), the regulator aims to full a
secondary public policy objective, requiring maximisation of the aggregate actions,
such as improvements in health and safety policies, corporate and social responsibility or
noise pollution. Since, by construction, the permit allocation schedule is independent of
emissions, the allocation mechanism results in cost-e¤ective permit market, in contrast
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to the outcome under updated grandfathering. Moreover, the PAC avoids the issues of
rewarding rms for past emissions (associated with grandfathering), whilst allowing for
the regulator to avoid the nancial burdens which a conventional permit auction would
impose on industry.
We considered an incomplete information game of PAC, where the permit allocation
schedule as well as the cost distribution are publicly known, but where each rms cost
parameter of external actions is the rms private information. To obtain the public
policy objective, the regulator must choose an optimal permit allocation schedule. We
nd that an egalitarian allocation schedule (whereby rms obtain identical permit al-
locations regardless of their external action) cannot achieve the public policy objective
as an egalitarian allocation schedule leads to zero aggregate external actions. Instead,
for the secondary public policy objective to be achieved, the schedule must be discrim-
inatory - at least for the lower-ranked permit allocations. Our numerical analysis is
in accordance with these theoretical results. It shows that for the maximum aggregate
external actions to be obtained, the lowest-ranked permit allocation has to be zero, and,
when costs of external actions are convex, the higher-ranked permit allocations have
to be less discriminatory. This paper provides guidance for policymakers on how to
implement a PAC and select an optimal permit allocation schedule for a public policy
objective. In particular, we have shown that the regulators optimal permit allocation
schedule will depend extensively on the structure and distribution of rmscosts, which
must be taken into consideration when implementing a PAC.
A PAC, at its simplest, has attempted to reach the middle ground between grand-
fathering and auctioning. On one hand, a PAC creates similar incentives to an auction
and could, in theory, e¢ ciently allocate permits. On the other hand, it has features
of grandfathering as it does not require politically unpopular monetary bids, and thus
reduces the nancial burden of regulation to industry. While a PAC does require other
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forms of expenditure, a suitably designed PAC may require expenditure on socially-
benecial activities which rms are already pursuing even in the absence of a PAC, or
which rms may nd to attractive to pursue. Thus, a suitable designed PAC may be
both politically feasible and e¢ cient. In addition, a PAC is a exible mechanism as
it allows ranking of rms using a wide variety of external actions, and thus could be
adapted to a variety of industrial and regional circumstances. Moreover, a PAC involves
a clear rule of prize allocation (i.e. no regulators subjective judgement is involved),
and are easily adaptable to changing market and technological conditions.
One possible practical di¢ culty of implementation of a PAC lies in the identication
and implementation of a suitable external action. This is because in order for the PAC
to achieve e¢ ciency, the external action must be independent of emissions, and in
addition it has to be politically agreeable to rms, the regulator and politicians. It
might be di¢ cult to identify an external action that satises all these requirements.
However, we hope that further research will help to overcome these identication and
implementation problems.
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